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Tweet Style:
Campaigning, Governing, and Social Media in Australia
Abstract. When politicians use the new tools of social media to 
talk directly to voters, how strategic are these communications?  
Do lawmakers change how they present themselves in different 
situations, tweeting differently during campaigns and when their 
party is out of power, or tailoring their ‘tweet style’ to the 
preferences of constituents?  I explore these questions by 
categorizing 291,091 tweets by sitting legislators in Australia, a 
nation that features variation in electoral systems in its two 
legislative houses and which held an election after widespread 
adoption of social media. When their party controls government, 
politicians tweet about their personal characteristics and about 
daily events more often, avoiding clear ideological positions.  
When an election is called, politicians both in government and in 
the opposition tweet toward their own sides of the ideological 
spectrum.
Key Words: Twitter, Australia, campaigns and elections, social media,
machine learning, 
content analysis
Word Count: 7969
For America’s president and for thousands of politicians across the 
globe, tweeting has become an increasingly prominent form of political 
communication.  For scholars examining the rhetoric of elected officials, 
candidates, and even of protesters, Twitter has become an increasingly 
promising and vital arena to study (Bruns and Moon 2018, Grant et al. 2010, 
Bruns and Highfield 2013, Bruns and Moon 2018, Graham et al. 2013, Evans, 
Cordova, and Sipole 2014, Evans and Clark 2016, Graham et al. 2016, 2017, 
McGregor et al. 2016).  It provides a vast repository of statements by a wide 
range of politicians, holding constant their medium of communication 
whether they are in a campaign cycle or in government.  Fine-grained 
measures of the timing of tweets allow scholars to study how messages 
change over time and under different political dynamics.  And Twitter has 
often become the outlet for the raw and unfiltered views of leaders, as 
President Trump’s feed has so often demonstrated. 
Yet analysing political communication through Twitter also poses 
challenges.  Can scholars extract meaningful messages from short bursts of 
text, and do so in a way that can be replicated across the hundreds, 
thousands or hundreds of thousands of tweets that a politician sends?  Prior 
studies have used both traditional human coding methods (Graham et al. 
2013, Evans and Clark 2016, Graham et al. 2016, 2017) and a range of 
computing tools (Barbera 2015, Barbera et al. 2015, Bruns and Highfield 
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2013, Grant et al. 2010, King, Orlando, and Sparks 2015) to categorize 
tweets.  
Both Vergeer (2015) and Jungherr (2016) presented detailed surveys of this 
literature.
In this paper, I adopt a strategy that combines the strengths of 
different quantitative approaches, using the hybrid of big data and small 
data methods termed ‘supervised learning’. I worked with a team of research
assistants to categorize the political features of a sample of 2500 tweets and
then used these categorizations to train computer algorithms, testing the 
algorithms to ensure that they could replicate the human decisions.  The 
final measurement step was to use the algorithms to code the entire set of 
291,091 tweets sent by every sitting legislator with a Twitter account 
Australia’s parliament.  
This approach unlocks a new avenue to explore how politicians 
communicate through Twitter, on a large scale.  To connect today’s tweets to
broader theories about longstanding political dilemmas, I loosely ground my 
exploration in Fenno’s (1977) classic investigation of legislators’ 
‘homestyles’, adapting his constructs to Australian ‘tweet styles’ through 
interviews with eleven current Australian officeholders.  While the analogies 
are necessarily imperfect, since they are transported from one nation to 
another and from personal interactions to social media communication, 
Fenno’s work directs attention to key strategic choices that politicians make 
when they interact with the public.  I focus on three relevant aspects of 
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tweet style – allocation of resources, presentation of self, and explanation of 
capitol activity – and set forth hypotheses about how these should shift in 
response to political circumstances.  
This project focuses on a country, Australia, in which the adoption of 
Twitter by politicians has become widespread over the past half-decade and 
has been studied by Grant et al. (2010), Bruns and Highfield (2013), and 
Bruns and Moon (2018).  Because the nation held a long campaign that led 
to a shift in the control of parliament, it is possible to isolate the impacts 
both of campaigning and of governing upon the communication of the same 
set of politicians over time.  Since party discipline in Australia’s parliament is 
so strong – making roll call analyses uninformative about the ideological 
positions of legislators – locating their positions on the left-to-right spectrum 
through their tweets provides both a new ideological map of Australian 
politics as well as an example of how this could be done in other legislatures 
with rigid party discipline.  Australia, then, is fertile ground to explore 
whether a combination of human and artificial intelligence can teach new 
lessons about political communication. 
After introducing hypotheses about Twitter communication by 
legislators and introducing my Australian dataset, I test these conjectures 
using the full set of all tweets ever sent by sitting Australian politicians in 
2015.  Subtle but significant changes in how politicians represent their 
positions demonstrate how campaigning and governing alters their 
communication strategies.  I show that when their party controls 
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government, politicians tweet more about personal events or characteristics,
avoiding clear ideological positions.  This fits with an emerging line of 
research into the personalization of Twitter and online political 
communication (Lee and Oh 2012, Enli and Skogerbø 2013, Kruikemeier et 
al. 2013, McGregor et al. 2016, Graham et al. 2017).  When an election is 
called, politicians change their behavior by tweeting more consistently 
toward their own side of the ideological spectrum. These findings speak to 
the literatures on candidates’ policy divergence during elections (Sullivan 
and Minns 1976, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001, and Burden 
2004).  I conclude by considering the broader implications of this Australian 
analysis for literatures on social media and politics. 
Hypotheses about Political Communication Through Twitter
Australia provides a fertile ground to explore social media 
communication strategies because Twitter has long been broadly adopted by
members of its Parliament.  On the Parliament of Australia’s official website, 
the roster of members lists not their office phone numbers or addresses but 
links to their Facebook pages and Twitter feeds (Parliament of Australia 
2016).  Social media is clearly important to these politicians.  According to 
the interviews that I conducted with eleven sitting federal and state 
lawmakers in early 2015, it is so important to those lawmakers that they 
each ran their handles themselves, usually from a mobile phone, rather than 
allowing a communications staff to tweet on their behalf as many members 
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of the US Congress do.1  Even those on the front bench, including Leader of 
the House Christopher Pyne and Leader of the Opposition in the Senate 
Penny Wong, reported to me that they sent their own tweets. 
 This allows for the study of unfiltered elite communication that reflects
– whether through a conscious set of choices or through the intuition of 
successful politicians – strategic political communication.  Who is listening to 
this communication?  Australia’s Twitter audience is growing but not yet 
universal, it is imperfectly representative of the electorate, and it is 
politically persuadable.  Bruns and Moon (2018, 427) report that there are 
3.5 million Australian Twitter accounts and that 19% of Australian internet 
users are on Twitter.  Many journalists tweet and cover the tweets of 
politicians, with journalistic coverage of tweets likely magnifying their reach 
beyond the immediate Twitter audience.  A poll conducted before Australia’s 
2016 elections by Galaxy Media showed that Twitter users are slightly more 
likely to be Labor or Greens voters than the general electorate, that 71% of 
users formulate their political views based on what they view on Twitter, and
that 22% reported shifting their support from one party to another in 
response to something they saw on Twitter.2  All of this suggests, then, that 
1 It is important to note that whether politicians tweet by themselves or 
whether political staff sometimes do so on their behalf – which is often the 
case in the United States – this is communication performed by a team to 
shape the public’s view of an individual.  Just like floor speeches and press 
releases are often crafted by lawmakers working with staff, tweets that 
emanate from a political office can reveal much about how politicians want 
to be viewed.  
2 See Galaxy Research, “The Australian Voter on Twitter,” at 
https://g.twimg.com/blog/blog/image/TWI-Election-Infographic.png
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while Twitter is not yet a mass media with universal reach, politicians can 
use this social media platform to communicate – either directly or through 
journalistic coverage – with a sizeable segment of the electorate who look for
political news on Twitter and who may change their political views based on 
what they read.        
What sorts of strategies, then, might Australian lawmakers pursue on 
Twitter?  A useful framework for thinking about how they use social media to 
present themselves can be adapted from Fenno’s (1977) classic work on the 
home styles adopted by members of Congress in their districts.  Each of the 
three components of a US Rep’s home style – allocation of resources, 
presentation of self, and explanation of capitol activity – has an analog in an 
Australian politician’s tweet style.  In the following three sections, I explore 
these components of home style, each of which will become a dependent 
variable in my empirical analysis.  
Allocation of Resources
When it comes to the allocation of resources, it might at first appear 
that the use of social media is relatively costless, compared to the price of 
flying back to a district or establishing a fully staffed office.  Yet according to 
Fenno (1977, 890), ‘Of all the resources available to the House member, the 
scarcest and most precious one, which dwarfs all others in posing critical 
allocative dilemmas, is his time’.  Tweeting, especially when it is done by a 
legislator herself, taxes the time and mental energy even of politicians who 
spend so much of their lives communicating.  When I interviewed Anne 
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McEwen, Chief Opposition Whip in the Senate, I noted that she very rarely 
tweeted.  ‘That’s right,’ she replied. ‘Partly this is because I’m not good at it, 
partly because it would take too much time’.3  
What factors should systematically predict whether legislators allocate 
enough of their time to build such followings?  Fenno theorizes that 
politicians facing electoral jeopardy will allocate more of their personal time 
and staff resources to their districts, in order to buttress themselves against 
any nascent or emerging political challenge.  The same logic should push 
Australian politicians to advertise themselves and their positions more 
frequently through Twitter.  Tweeting is one (of many) ways for them to build
political support, and they will tweet most actively when they face the 
greatest threat.  
Two measures can identify the legislators who should face the most 
electoral jeopardy.  First, the 150 House members who run in single-member
districts every three years (or sooner, if an early election is called) will be 
more focused on reelection than the 76 senators, who run every six years in 
proportional representation contests held in each state or territory.  Facing 
more frequent reelections brings more electoral jeopardy, which should 
motivate legislators to allocate more of their time to building connections to 
voters through tweeting.  Second, district-level political competition should 
influence tweet style.  Some legislators expect to face closer elections than 
3 Interview with federal Senator and Chief Opposition Whip in the Senate Ann
McEwen, Labor Party, conducted by the author in Adelaide, South Australia, 
June 9, 2015. 
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others, increasing their electoral jeopardy and motivating them to tweet 
more often.  House members who won with tighter margins of victory in the 
2013 election will feel greater threat than those who won with larger 
majorities.  Thus two empirical hypotheses test the idea that electoral 
pressures lead legislators to allocate more of their time to social media 
communication. 
Hypothesis 1. Compared to senators (elected every six years through 
PR), House members (elected every three years or fewer in SMDs) will 
tweet at a higher rate.
Hypothesis 2. When the margin of victory by House members is 
narrower, the frequency of tweets since the last election will be higher.
Presentation of Self
Political leaders also choose a strategic presentation of self.  To Fenno, 
this is the centerpiece of home style, with politicians pursuing either a 
person-to-person or an issue-oriented approach.  Australian politicians both 
give and give off an expression of themselves through Twitter when they 
choose either to reveal a collection of details about their personal tastes and 
daily pursuits or to use it primarily as a pulpit to espouse their political views.
Each approach serves an important goal.  
If they adopt a person-to-person style, ‘members of Congress go home 
to present themselves ‘as a person’ – and to win the accolade ‘He’s a good 
man,’ ‘She’s a good woman.’ …The congressman conveys a sense of 
identification with his constituents.  Contextually and verbally, he gives them
the impression that ‘I am one of you.’ (Fenno 1977, 898, 899, emphasis in 
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original).  Some Australian politicians use Twitter the same way, seeking to 
connect personally with their constituents.  Federal MP Andrew Southcott 
sees the value in this approach, though his political advisors may not. 
‘Sometimes the party people will say that I shouldn’t tweet about being at a 
football game,’ reports Southcott, ‘but I was there and so were 50,000 
voters’.4  By contrast, legislators with a more issue-oriented style seek to find
common ground in policy positions, or simply by addressing pressing issues 
of the day.  Their tweets will focus on policy rather than personality.   
Scholars from multiple disciplines looking at nations that range from 
the UK to the US to the Netherlands to South Korea to Norway have, often 
independently, identified and explored the use of personalization in the 
tweets of politicians.  When politicians highlight ‘their personal lives over 
their policy positions’ (McGregor et al. 2016, 264), this can convey 
‘authenticity’ (Graham et al. 2017, 140) and ‘allow politicians to stage their 
own multidimensional personae on a continuous basis’ (Enli and Skogerbø 
2013, 770).  Experimental evidence from Lee and Oh (2012) and Kruikemeier
et al. (2013) shows that personalizing online communication can lead to 
better message recall and can increase citizens’ sense that they have 
contact with politicians.
How do politicians choose their presentation of self?  In Fenno’s 
analysis, the issue-oriented approach brings more political risks than the 
person-to-person style, because issue positions are ‘potentially 
4 Interview with federal MP Andrew Southcott, Liberal Party, conducted by 
the author in Adelaide, South Australia, March 31, 2015.
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divisive’(1977, 902).  In Australia, one group of politicians who may wish to 
shy away from discussing divisive issues on Twitter are those in the 
governing party.  Members of the government may avoid the unnecessary 
risk of taking clear stands on controversial issues online for the same reason 
that campaign front-runners often avoid debates.  They could seek to elevate
themselves above the fray, leaving it to their challengers to press a policy 
argument. These incentives work in a way that is similar to what Bruns and 
Highfield (2013, p. 676) found in their analysis of tweets in the 2012 
elections in the Australian state of Queensland, in which the campaign 
frontrunner could tweet more passively, while the other party ‘needed to try 
a considerably more aggressive approach to changing voters’ views’.  If this 
is the case, we should observe a higher ratio of safely personal tweets – ones
that demonstrate no clear ideological leanings – when a party is in power.  
Running in a campaign may also affect the calculus of politicians, 
pushing them to present themselves in the most broadly appealing light 
possible.  After an election is called, the stakes of every word that a politician
says or tweets are heightened.  Legislators consciously internalize this 
heighted sense of risk and change their communication strategies in 
response to it, according to the testimony of Andrew Leigh, a federal Labor 
Party MP.  On Twitter, he says, ‘My goal is to be interesting. During elections,
though, I’m very careful in what I say or what articles I point to, because the 
cost of a gaffe is high when people are fighting for their jobs.’5  This risk 
5 Interview with federal MP Andrew Leigh, Labor Party, conducted by the 
author in Canberra, Australian Capital Territory on May 19, 2015.
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aversion should lead legislators to shift their focus to personal topics or other
non-ideological tweet content when an election has been called.  And 
campaign pressures should exert their strongest effects on legislators from 
competitive districts.  When an election is called in a competitive district with
a relatively even balance of left- and right-leaning voters, politicians should 
be especially wary of alienating some voters by sending out ideological 
tweets.  District competition should thus bring a contextual interaction, 
heightening the impact of campaign timing. 
Finally, the chamber in which an Australian legislator serves should 
influence the relative rates of personal versus ideological communication, 
again because the chambers feature different electoral systems.  Ranked 
choice (preferential) voting is used to count votes in the single-member 
districts of the House.  This means that House members can aim for a 
majority of the ‘two-party preferred’ vote by combining both the first-choice 
votes that they win themselves and the ballots of those who cast a first-
choice vote for a minor party candidate but then a second-choice vote for 
the major party contestant.  Knowing that votes for far-left or far-right minor 
parties will eventually flow back to them, the major party candidates can 
stay much closer to the median voter.  By contrast, Senators run in 
proportional representation contests with (in most cases) twelve seats.  
Voters can vote for a single party, making this in practice a party list system.
This gives candidates incentives to play to a narrow base and exerts a 
centrifugal force on their positions (Cox 1990).  Legislators looking to please 
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the political centre should adopt a person-to-person style, while those who 
seek to rally their party faithful can risk the issue-based approach of 
ideological tweets.   
Hypothesis 3. When a party controls the government, a smaller 
proportion of the tweets that its members send will be discernibly 
ideological.           
Hypothesis 4. When an election is called, a smaller proportion of the 
tweets that its legislators send will be discernibly ideological.
Interaction: This effect should be stronger in House districts that 
have narrow margins of victory than in less competitive House 
districts. 
Hypothesis 5. Compared to Senators (elected through PR), House 
members (who are elected in SMDs) will send a smaller proportion of 
discernibly ideological tweets.           
Explanation of Capitol Activity
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, when Australian politicians do 
adopt an issue-oriented style, one more decision remains.  When they 
explain their Canberra, the dilemma that legislators face with each tweet is 
about whether to take a position that is consistent with their party’s 
traditional side of the ideological spectrum, or to attempt to reach out across
the ideological divide by taking a position that could have cross-over appeal 
to the other party or coalition. Compared to the avenues of mass media 
communication that were available to politicians just a decade ago, the rise 
of social media allows lawmakers greater control over this choice of how to 
present themselves.  Penny Wong, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, 
leverages the unfiltered nature of Twitter to set her own policy agenda when 
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she explains her capitol activity.  ‘When you do a media interview, you 
necessarily are broadcasting.  What Twitter does allow you to do is to talk 
about issues that you wouldn’t necessarily get to in an interview.’6 
Because Twitter gives them the chance to explain their votes and 
positions exactly as they want, exactly when they want to, politicians should 
use it to craft their ideological profiles in response to shifting political 
dynamics.  When it fits their strategic aims, they can send out tweets that 
are consistent with their party’s side of the ideological spectrum.  In other 
circumstances, they may benefit from taking positions that cross over into 
their competitor’s ideological territory, just as Julie Bishop tweeted left-
leaning stances when she served as Foreign Minister in the (right-leaning) 
Coalition government.  Each legislator creates a portfolio of tweets that 
communicate their overall position on the ideological spectrum.
Serving in government, Bishop’s example suggests, might be one 
factor that pushes lawmakers closer to the centre.  In order to broaden their 
appeal and thus keep approval ratings for the government high, governing 
lawmakers have an incentive to mix in a few tweets with crossover appeal to
the other party’s voters.  By contrast, members of the opposition may find 
the most advantage in drawing clear contrasts between their positions and 
the government’s by tweeting stances that are consistent with their 
traditional ideology.
6 Interview with federal Senator and Leader of the Opposition in the Senate 
Penny Wong, Labor Party, conducted by the author in Adelaide, South 
Australia on July 10, 2015.
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Politicians also face clear incentives to present themselves 
strategically during campaigns, though it is not perfectly clear which 
ideological direction they should pursue during a contest.  One strategy 
would be to attempt to win new supporters by tweeting many positions that 
cross over into the other party’s traditional ideology.  This can broaden 
support, though it may come at the expense of appearing opportunistic.7  
Another reasonable choice would be to take a position more in line with party
orthodoxy during an election, sending a mixture of tweets that fits the 
preferences of the party’s electoral base.  This motivates voters who share 
those positions, and reassures all types of voters that a politician is authentic
and consistent in her ideological message.  When candidates campaign 
through other media platforms, we see examples both of politicians playing 
to their base or attempting to win crossover support.  Twitter gives us a new 
realm to test directly when a lawmaker projects a different ideology when an
election is called. 
Hypothesis 6. When a party controls the government, its members will 
tweet more positions that appeal to the other party’s ideological base 
than they do when serving in the opposition.  
Hypothesis 7. When an election is called, legislators will seek crossover
support by sending more tweets that match the other party’s 
traditional ideological position. 
Hypothesis 7 Alternative. When an election is called, legislators 
will play to their base by sending more tweets that match their 
7 Whether a politician plays to her base or seeks crossover support may 
depend upon her position within her party: top cabinet and shadow cabinet 
leaders seeking to appeal to a national constituency may shift toward the 
center during a campaign, while rank-and-file legislators may tweet to their 
party bases.  I test this potential interaction effect in my multivariate 
analysis.  
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traditional ideological position. 
Measuring Ideology Through Tweets
In this project, I used a supervised learning approach to gauge 
ideology from the text of tweets.  In the Online Appendix , I describe in detail
how I worked with a team of research assistants to code the ideology of an 
initial set of 2500 tweets, then use the human codings to train machine 
learning algorithms to replicate this categorization for the full corpus of all 
291,091 tweets sent by Australian legislators through August, 2015.  In the 
main text, I demonstrate the validity of this approach by addressing three 
key questions.  First, can human coding of tweets demonstrate intercoder 
reliability and face validity, with human coders agreeing with each other and 
placing tweets in categories that make sense to other researchers?  Second, 
can machine-learning algorithms trained to replicate the coding decisions of 
humans do so with precision?  Third, when I use the categorizations of their 
tweets to locate Australian politicians on the ideological spectrum, do these 
measures match other data on their positions and does elite ideology line up 
with the preferences of voters?  
Research assistants coded each tweet as either left-leaning, right-
leaning, or non-ideological (a category that included tweets which were 
either completely apolitical or politically neutral, such as tweets advocating 
better health in the population or expressing shock at a violent incident).  
This single, three-category variable is then the basis of my analysis below of 
15
both personal vs. ideological tweeting (in Tables 2 and 3) and of right-leaning
vs. left-leaning tweeting (in Table 4 and Figure 4). The Appendix reports that 
the team recorded strong levels of intercoder reliability (with agreement 
scores averaging 83% across pairs of coders for this variable, and a Cohen’s 
kappa of 0.75) and provides evidence that the algorithms were able to 
replicate these human codes with a high degree of precision and recall 
(exceeding 71% in all cases individually, and correctly replicating the human 
codes in 80% of cases through an ensemble approach).  These levels of 
predictive validity compare favourably to prior work. 
Figure 1 displays the percentage of tweets that fall into each of the 
three categories, first according to the human codings in my training set of 
2500 and then according to the algorithms used to code the full corpus.  
About half of the tweets are communications with no ideological content.  
This is an important reminder that Australia’s politicians do not use Twitter 
only for stump speeches.  Often, they are using the immediacy and intimacy 
of social media to give their followers a window into their meeting schedules,
frustrations with traffic, sporting loyalties, and menu choices.  (I use the term
‘personal’ to describe these non-ideological tweets hereafter, while 
acknowledging that this category includes other types of non-ideological 
tweets – such as information about community events or congratulatory 
tweets to people who are not political figures – that do not contain personal 
revelations.)  But the other half of their tweets show discernible ideological 
leanings, either to the right or, slightly more often, to the left.  For each 
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individual, I create two scores.  First, I record the percentage of each 
politician’s total tweets that are non-ideological, a measure of the more 
personal tweets that would follow from a person-to-person tweet style.  
Second, I assign each officeholder an ideological score that records the 
percentage of that politician’s ideological tweets that lean to the right.  
[Figure 1 About Here]
This score places every Australian politician on the left-to-right 
ideological spectrum, based on Twitter communication.  What evidence do 
we have that this produces a sensible, coherent 
ideological map?  A unique and useful survey of candidates for federal office 
fielded by the Australian National University after every election provides an 
anonymous look at the positions of 192 politicians who can be grouped by 
party.  Jackman (1998), which provides a rigorous ideological scaling of the 
Australian parliament, relies on this source.  The 2013 Australian Candidate 
Study (McAlister et al. 2013) asks 28 policy questions, which I treat like roll 
calls and use optimal classification (Poole et al. 2014) to place each 
candidate on a left-to-right ideological spectrum.  
The first graph in Figure 2 groups candidates into parties, based on this
elite survey.  It shows that Labor Party members generally take policy 
positions on the left while members of the Liberal-National Coalition are 
more often on the right, though there is considerable overlap between the 
two parties.  To test convergent validity, the second graph in this figure 
shows the tweet-based ideological scores of politicians, grouped the same 
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way.  The ideological score is the percentage of ideological tweets that are 
right-leaning, with neutral tweets removed from analysis.  Again, Labor 
legislators are consistently on the left, with the Coalition on the right.  Again 
there is significant overlap between the two parties.  Ordering politicians by 
their ranks on these two scales further confirms their convergence.8  One 
advantage of the tweet-based measure is that, because it is not anonymous, 
one can identify the leaders in this area of overlap: Coalition moderates like 
Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and Andrew Southcott are indeed in the overlap 
zone, as are ‘Labor Right’ faction leaders such as Chris Bowen and Richard 
Marles.  Their placement provides further confidence that this measure 
effectively captures ideology.  
[Figure 2 About Here]
Finally, Figure 3 provides a test of predictive validity: If tweets are a 
reliable measure of ideology, then the positions of politicians on Twitter 
should match the preferences of voters in their districts.  This scatterplot 
charts, for each House of Representatives district, the 2013 share of the vote
won by the Coalition candidate (the ‘two-party-preferred vote, by division,’ 
gathered from Australian Election Commission, 2015) against the proportion 
8 Ranking MPs by the percentage of ideological tweets that are right-leaning, 
the most leftist Coalition member (Julie Bishop) is in the 18th percentile, while
the most right-leaning Labor politician (Richard Marles) is in the 68th 
percentile.  The “party overlap” interval thus runs for 50 percentile points.  
Ranking candidates who responded to the poll (a group that consisted of 
more Labor candidates than Coalition), the “party overlap” interval ranges 
from the 44th percentile to the 88th, or 44 percentile points.  The similarity 
between these overlap ranges confirms the convergence between these two 
measures of ideological position.   
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of ideological tweets by the eventual winner that leaned to the right.  The 
strong positive relationship shows that more conservative districts elected 
legislators who tweeted more conservatively.  This confirms the predictive 
validity of the measure, while providing evidence that social media 
communication responds to electoral signals in Australian politics. 
[Figure 3 About Here]
Predicting Tweet Style: The Impact of Governing and Campaigns
Allocation of Resources
My first analysis is of the simplest statistic: the number of tweets sent 
by each sitting legislator from the date of the September 2013 election until 
August 2015, when I collected every member’s data.  Tweet frequency 
measures the allocation of a politician’s precious resource of her time, and 
ranges from zero (in the cases of the 62 legislators who did not have a 
Twitter account, making up 27% of the House and Senate combined) to the 
3,284 tweets sent by Greens Party MP Adam Bandt, whose ‘sophisticated 
understanding of how social media works’ was lauded as key to his 
surprising win in a Melbourne constituency.9  The average number of tweets 
was 877.  Just as Fenno’s MCs flew back to their districts more often and 
invested in local offices when they faced electoral threats, Australian 
politicians should tweet more when political pressures are highest.  One 
initial piece of evidence for this contention is that Twitter usage spiked for all
members in the month leading up to the 2013 election.  Combined, 
9 Quote taken from Van Badham, “Adam Bandt’s Victory in Melbourne is No 
Fluke, And That’s Worth Celebrating,” The Guardian, September 8, 2013. 
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Australian lawmakers tweeted 11,246 times during that month, up from 
6,467 during the previous 30 days.  The month after the election, they took a
social media vacation, tweeting only 4,234 times.   
Are there systematic patterns in which types of legislators tweet the 
most?  One obvious confound is the age of a legislator, which I control for in 
a multivariate model, but I begin with a bivariate exploration of the theory-
driven variables.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that the tweeting rate of House 
members should be higher than the rate of senators, because they run for 
office more frequently and do so in single-member districts.  Since the 2013 
election, House members sent an average of 983 tweets, while senators 
tweeted 626 times, a difference in means that is statistically significant at 
the p<0.05 level.  Hypothesis 2 asserts that lawmakers should tweet more 
often when they represent tightly competitive House districts.  At first 
glance, there is some apparent link: Legislators in districts with a margin of 
victory closer than ten percentage points tweet an average of 1,054 times, 
those in districts with margins between ten and twenty points tweet 897 
times, and those who won by more than twenty points tweet 824 times.  Yet 
this effect is neither strong nor significant in a difference in means test.  
The ordinary least squares models presented in Table 1, which control 
for a legislator’s gender, age, position in the cabinet, and party affiliation, 
test these hypotheses in multivariate models.  The results in the first column,
a model using data from all legislators, provide strong evidence consistent 
with Hypothesis 1: House members tweet more often, sending an average of 
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438.6 more tweets, all else equal.  This is significant at p<0.01.  Not 
surprisingly, younger lawmakers also tweet more, sending about 23 more 
tweets for every year younger they are (p<0.01).  The second column tests 
Hypothesis 2’s conjecture that more competition leads to more tweeting, by 
comparing House members based on the margins of victory in their districts. 
As in the bivariate test, it does not exert a significant impact.  House 
members, who run in single-member districts, and younger legislators are 
the lawmakers who allocate more of their time to tweeting.
[Table 1 About Here]
Presentation of Self
To test Hypotheses 3-5, I use the supervised learning coding of tweets 
as ideological or not in order to ask when politicians communicate in a 
person-to-person style and when they pursue an issue-oriented approach.  In
these analyses, the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure indicating 
that a tweet had no discernable ideological content.  When leaders use 
Twitter to build trust with voters by making a personal connection– perhaps 
by talking about sitting in traffic, rooting for a sports team, or eating a local 
food – more of their tweets should be non-ideological.
In this and in all analyses that follow, my sample is the set of 
legislators sitting in Australia’s national parliament in 2015 who had Twitter 
accounts.  According to my hypotheses, politicians should shift toward this 
sort of person-to-person communication when the risks of an issue-based 
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approach are highest: When their party is in government, and during a 
campaign (especially when they represent a competitive district).  Australian
politics in the social media era provides a strong research design for 
conducting these tests.  With the 2013 election bringing a switch in party 
control just around the midpoint of our time period, I can compare how a 
given politician tweeted differently in and out of government and before, 
during, and after an election.  Because this comparison is only possible for 
those who served both before and after the election, I remove the tweets of 
all members newly elected in 2013 from this analysis.  By using legislator 
fixed effects, then, I can hold constant the political characteristics and 
individual idiosyncrasies of each politician, isolating the impacts of governing
and campaigning.  I also report cluster-robust standard errors, clustered by 
legislator, because errors and error variances are likely correlated across the
messages tweeted by each lawmaker (see Cameron and Miller 2015).
The models presented in Table 2 use this approach, presenting the 
results of linear probability models with legislator fixed effects that evaluate 
the impact of the two factors that shift over time.  When, exactly, did these 
shifts occur?  The Labor Party captured control of the government in 2007, 
before the first tweet appears in our dataset.  On January 30th, 2013, Labor 
Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced that an election would be held on 
September 14th of that year,10 leading to ‘a surreal seven-and-a-half months 
of campaigning (Johnson, Wanna, and Lee 2015, 1).’  That campaign became
10 See Judith Ireland and Daniel Hurst, “PM Announces Election for September
14th,” Sydney Morning Herald, January 30th, 2013.
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even more extraordinary in June when Gillard was overthrown by fellow 
Labor MP Kevin Rudd, whom she had unseated three years earlier when he 
was serving as prime minister.11  Rudd then scheduled the election for 
September 7, hoping to capitalize on the sharp rise in his party’s chances of 
winning – as documented in the election betting markets data collected by 
Jackman (2015, 146) – that followed the dramatic ‘leadership spill.’  Yet that 
proved to be a temporary bump, with the Liberal-Nationals Coalition winning 
an overwhelming victory and bringing Prime Minister Tony Abbot into office 
in September, 2013 (until he, too, was overthrown after my period of study 
ended).  All of this political turmoil provides a strong interrupted time-series 
design.  I code my ‘Election Has Been Called’ variable as ‘1’ for the January 
30-September 7th, 2013 period, and my ‘Legislator’s Party is in Government’ 
variable as ‘1’ for Labor Party members before September 7, 2013 and ‘1’ for
Liberal and Nationals legislators thereafter.
[Table 2 About Here]
As the first results column in Table 2 shows, Australian politicians 
tweet differently when they are in or out of government and during 
campaigns.  Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the likelihood that a tweet is non-
ideological rises by 4 per cent when a legislator’s party is in government, 
compared to being in the opposition.  This effect is strongly significant 
(p<0.01), and consistent with what a simple bivariate analysis shows.12  
11 See James Grubel, “Rudd Sworn in as Australian PM After Overthrowing 
Gillard,” June 27, 2013, Reuters. 
12 In a simple comparison that does not also account for the impact of 
campaigns or consistent differences across parties, 61.0% of the tweets by 
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There is also a clear election-year effect that is in keeping with Hypothesis 4:
when Gillard called elections, the likelihood that a tweet is safely 
non-ideological rose by 2 per cent on average.  Again, this effect is strongly 
significant (p<0.01).
Drawing on Fenno’s logic, though, election effects should depend upon 
the heterogeneity of a legislative district.  In a homogenous constituency 
that sides strongly with one party, ideological tweeting might be safe even 
under the pressure of a campaign, while campaign effects will be felt most 
sharply in competitive, heterogeneous districts.  For House members, I can 
test this
interaction.  The second column of results repeats the baseline model, 
throwing out Senate members.  It shows that the significant impacts of 
governing and campaigning remain when I isolate House members.  Yet the 
interaction between the campaign indicator and the margin of victory in a 
House district, while it moves in the expected direction, falls far short of 
significance.  
To test Hypothesis 5’s conjecture that House members will tweet less 
ideologically than Senate members because of the different electoral 
systems through which they are selected, I cannot use a fixed effects 
analysis because so few legislators switch houses.  Consequently, the 
regression model in Table 3 simply analyzes each legislator’s overall rate of 
non-ideological tweeting with the same set of control variables used in my 
governing party legislators are non-ideological, while 53.1% of opposition 
party tweets are non-ideological.  
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analysis of tweet frequency.  The results show that House members have a 
higher likelihood of sending non-ideological tweets than senators.  Though 
there are of course systematic differences between senators and House 
members other than their electoral systems, this effect is consistent with the
hypothesis that the centripetal pressures of single-member districts 
encourage a person-to-person tweet style, while senators elected by 
proportional representation are more free to express their ideologies to a 
narrower electoral base. I also find that cabinet or shadow cabinet members 
are more likely to risk ideological tweets, while backbenchers tweet more 
about non-ideological matters.  All of these effects are significant at p<0.01.
[Table 3 About Here]
Explanation of Capitol Activity
When politicians do adopt an issue-oriented style by sending out 
ideological tweets, do they take positions in line with their party’s traditional 
alignments or do they often cross over to the other side of the political 
spectrum?  In Hypothesis 6, I predicted that legislators whose party was in 
power would be more likely to send crossover tweets in order to broaden the
government’s popular support, while lawmakers in opposition will seek to 
draw sharp contrasts by tweeting in line with their traditional party positions.
Hypothesis 7 predicts that during campaign all legislators will send more 
crossover tweets, while a plausible alternative hypothesis is that they will 
play to their base when they tweet during election season. 
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Table 4 estimates models predicting whether an ideological tweet 
points in the direction of a legislator’s party base -- to the left for Labor Party
members or to the right for Liberals and Nationals. (The Greens are excluded
because their members never served in government.)  As in Table 2, a single
tweet is the unit of observation, and the models include legislator fixed 
effects to show how governing and campaigns alter a given politician’s 
communications style.  Only ideological tweets are included in the models, 
with neutrals tweets removed. 
[Table 4 About Here]
Consistent with Hypothesis 6, governing pushes members toward a 
more centrist explanation of their capitol activity, with the likelihood that an 
ideological tweet leans toward the party’s base decreasing by 11 per cent 
when that party holds office.  This effect is strongly significant at the p<0.01 
level.  Yet this effect only holds for the Labor Party.  An interaction between 
the governing variable and membership in the Coalition almost wholly 
counteracts the main effect, 
showing that the direction in which Liberal and Nationals legislators tweeted 
was not affected by whether they were in or out of government.  Still, for 
Labor legislators, governing clearly matters.
The dynamic that alters the behavior of all parties is campaigning: 
After the 2013 election was called, Labor politicians increasingly played to 
their left-leaning base, while the Liberal and Nationals tweeted more 
consistently to the right.  During the campaign, the likelihood that a tweet 
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leaned toward each party’s base rose by 3 per cent.  There is no significant 
interaction with party for this campaign effect, and separate models (not 
reported) run for each party reveal consistent effects.
The fact that all of the parties play to their base during a campaign, rather 
than crossing over to the center, is surprising and fits not with Hypothesis 7 
but with the alternative conjecture.  Still, it is a plausible electoral tactic that 
appears to be pursued by parties on both sides of the ideological spectrum.  
It is also, as the results in the second column show, a tactic that is pursued 
as much by cabinet members as by backbenchers.  I interacted frontbench 
status with the election year indicator, and also with the governing indicator.
Neither interaction was significant, showing that a legislator’s position the 
parliamentary hierarchy does not condition the impact of governing or 
campaigning. 
Finally, I illustrate the strong impact of campaigning on tweet style in 
the time series graph of Figure 4.  Not based on any regression, it simply 
shows the percentage of tweets sent by Coalition legislators that were right 
leaning in the periods before, during, and after the 2013 election.  Clearly 
and significantly, they play toward their base while campaigning and then 
move back to the center.  The right-leaning percentages of tweets by 
coalition members are nearly identical before (53.2%) and after (52.4%) the 
election, but rise substantively and statistically significantly during the 
election to 60.9%.
Conclusion
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The central message of this analysis is that politicians change their 
social media communication strategies when political circumstances change,
responding rationally to the demands of governing and campaigns.  
Australian legislators adapt their tweet styles to changing incentives in much
the same way that members of the US Congress shape their home styles to 
their districts (Fenno 1977).  They allocate more of their time to tweeting if 
they serve in the Australian House rather than the Senate, perhaps because 
serving for shorter terms brings more political jeopardy.  Members of both 
chambers shift away from issue-oriented ideological tweets when their party 
holds government, instead adopting a ‘personalized’ style by tweeting more 
about the uncontroversial details of their daily lives.  During campaigns, 
lawmakers also shy away from ideological tweeting, especially if their district
is electorally competitive.  Finally, when an election is called, members of 
Australia’s three major parties tweet toward their party’s traditional 
ideological direction rather than seeking cross-over appeal
This finding is striking, because it departs from the Downsian drift 
toward the center sometimes observed in other mediums of political 
communication.  Yet it is consistent with influential works on US House 
elections showing that candidates diverge on the ideological spectrum, 
contrary to simple Downsian logic (Sullivan and Minns 1976, Ansolabehere, 
Snyder, and Stewart 2001, and Burden 2004).  Is this dynamic encouraged 
by Twitter?  Perhaps this is enabled by the fact that Twitter’s audience is far 
from universal.  With only one in five Australians on Twitter, and far fewer 
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following any individual politician, it may be that Twitter gives lawmakers the
opportunity to speak to a narrow, segmented audience, preaching to their 
choir and delivering different messages than they would through broadcast 
media.  This suggests further areas of study, such as comparing political 
communication over Twitter to the messages that politicians convey on 
Facebook.  That platform reaches 95% of Australians on the internet (Bruns 
and Moon 2018, 427).  Comparing messages across these two platforms, and
with traditional mass media outlets, could teach important lessons about 
how the choice of medium affects messaging strategies.    
   Finally, this study introduces and validates an approach to studying 
politicians on Twitter – the combination of human coding and machine 
learning – which complements existing methods for studying a form of 
political communication that is rapidly becoming a critical way for politicians 
to reach voters, in Australia and around the world.    
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Figure 1. The Distribution of Tweets Across Ideological Categories
Left-Leaning Non-Ideological Right-Leaning
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Hand Coding of 2500 Tweets Full Corpus of 291,029 Tweets
33
Figure 2. Convergent Validity: Comparing Positions in Survey with 
Tweet Ideology
Figure 2A. Scaled Ideology from 28 Questions in 2013 Australian 
Candidate Survey
Figure 2B. Ideology from Tweets by House Members Elected in 2013
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Figure 3. Predictive Validity: Do Constituent Voting Patterns Predict 
Tweets?   
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Figure 4. The Impact on Campaigning on Tweeting to the Ideological
Base
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Table 1. Predicting Tweet Frequency Since the 2013 Election
Both Chambers House Only 
House (Rather than 
Senate) 438.60**
134.28
Margin of Victory 8.35
6.59
Age -23.45** -22.13**
6.93 8.37
Male Legislator -202.00 -105.52
140.94 176.06
Frontbencher (Cabinet 
or Shadow) 111.77 -7.97
167.44 192.36
Greens Party 1,734.39 1,392.74
926.11 934.69
Liberal Party -719.07** -923.32**
134.67 164.62
Nationals Party -623.30** -954.75**
229.80 282.82
Constant 2,271.18** 2,576.89**
385.74 451.39
Observations 222 149
R-squared 0.23 0.27
Notes: Table entries are coefficients and standard errors in 
ordinary least squares regressions. The omitted baseline party is 
the Labor Party. ** indicates p<.01, * indicates p<.05
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Table 2. Predicting Personal (vs. Ideological) Tweeting, by tweet
Both
Chambers House Only
Legislator's Party is in Government 0.04** 0.03**
0.008 0.009
Election Has Been Called 0.02** 0.03**
0.005 0.012
Interaction of Election Year and 
Margin of Victory
0.0005
0.0005
Constant 0.54** 0.56**
0.003 0.004
legislator fixed effects included included
legislator clustered errors included included
Observations 291,091 217,425
R-squared 0.01 0.01
Notes: Table entries are coefficients and clustered standard errors in 
ordinary least squares regressions, with individual legislator fixed effects 
included. ** indicates p<.01, * indicates p<.05
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Table 3. Predicting Personal (vs. Ideological) Tweeting, by politician
Legislators Both
Chambers with
Twitter Accounts
Legislators in House
with Twitter
Accounts
House (Rather than 
Senate) 6.02**
1.30
Margin of Victory 0.04
0.06
Age 0.04 0.12
0.07 0.07
Male Legislator 0.79 1.41
1.31 1.50
Frontbencher (Cabinet or 
Shadow) -3.94** -4.51**
1.41 1.53
Greens Party -6.73 -7.18
7.35 7.20
Liberal Party 5.86** 5.93**
1.26 1.42
Nationals Party 6.60** 5.61*
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2.31 2.71
Constant 48.72** 49.72**
3.55 3.92
Observations 162 118
R-squared 0.30 0.28
Notes: Table entries are coefficients and standard errors in ordinary 
least squares regressions. The omitted baseline party is the Labor Party. 
** indicates p<.01, * indicates p<.05
Table 4. Predicting Base-Leaning Tweets, when a Tweet is 
Ideological 
All Legislators
Serving Before
and After
Election
All Legislators
Serving Before
and After
Election
Election Has Been Called 0.03** 0.04**
0.01 0.01
Legislator's Party is in 
Government -0.11** -0.10**
0.01 0.01
Interaction of Government X 
Coalition 0.10** 0.10**
0.02 0.017
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Interaction of Election X 
Frontbencher -0.01
0.02
Interaction of Govt. X 
Frontbencher -0.02
0.02
Constant 0.61** 0.61**
0.003 0.003
Observations 93,745 93,745
legislator fixed effects included included
legislator clustered errors included included
R-squared 0.004 0.001
Notes: Table entries are coefficients and clustered standard errors in 
ordinary least squares regressions, with individual legislator fixed effects
included. ** indicates p<.01, * indicates p<.05
Online Appendix: Categorizing Politicians’ Tweets
How should political tweets be turned into a meaningful dataset?  Prior 
studies have taken one of two approaches.  Some scholars have looked 
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closely at a manageable number of tweets, using their expertise or teams of 
research assistants to categorize the text that they contain (Graham et al. 
2013, Evans and Clark 2016, Graham et al. 2016, 2017).  Other scholars use 
computing tools to quantify whether political tweets are original, retweets, or
interactions (Grant et al. 2010, Bruns and Highfield 2013, Bruns and Moon 
2018).  Additional work has substituted artificial intelligence for human 
judgement, leveraging the power of “unsupervised learning’ techniques to 
capture the sentiment of a massive number of tweets (Murthy 2015)13 or by 
using the social networks of Twitter followers to infer the ideology of 
politicians and their followers (Barbera 2015, Barbera et al. 2015, King, 
Orlando, and Sparks 2015).  Some have even attempted to predict elections 
through tweets (but see Metaxes et al. 2011).14 
This paper adopts a method designed to leverage the strengths of both
approaches, by combining human with artificial intelligence.  The first step in
the supervised learning approach to classifying text is for human coders to 
study documents closely and then to place them into categories.  This 
application to Twitter raises the initial questions of whether coders can judge
the ideology of politician’s tweets in a way that is consistent across coders 
and which makes sense to a broader research community.  Since the initial 
coders for this project were three undergraduate research assistants working
13 Murthy, Dhiraj. 2015. "Twitter and Elections: Are Tweets, Predictive, 
Reactive, or a Form of Buzz?" Information, Communication & Society 18(7): 
816-31.
14 Metaxes, Panagioti T., Eni Mustafaraj, and Dani Gayo-Avello. 2011. “How 
(Not) to Predict Elections.” International Conference on Social Computing.
43
at an American public university, the first task was to familiarize them with 
the way in which contemporary issues translated onto the political spectrum 
in Australia.  Though geographically distant, Australia’s politics are not 
completely foreign to the United States.  The researchers and the author 
spent a month reading Australian newspapers, including the Sydney Morning
Herald, the Adelaide Advertiser, the Australian, and the [Melbourne] Age, 
and consulting sources that list ‘left’ and ‘right’ beliefs (McCandless and 
Posavec 2013), to compile the list of issue positions on each side listed in 
Appendix Table A.1.  This table was the basis of a set of coding instructions 
that asked the researchers to code tweets as either left-leaning, right-
leaning, or non-ideological (a category that included tweets which were 
either completely apolitical or politically neutral, such as tweets advocating 
better health in the population or expressing shock at a violent incident).  
Table A.2 gives examples of the types of tweets that the researchers 
placed into each category.  Right-leaning tweets trumpet efforts to cut 
through red tape, to stop illegal immigrants from arriving by boats from 
Southeast Asia (the common ‘stop the boats’ refrain, similar to American 
proposals to ‘build the wall’), to repeal a tax on carbon emissions, and to 
repeal a Mining Tax, as well as a 2014 visit by Julie Bishop, the Liberal Party’s
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the site of the controversial war in Iraq.  Left-
leaning tweets include a discussion of a rally for renewable energy and a 
condemnation of off-shoring jobs, an attack on a gendered phrase, and 
support for an NGO, The Gender Agency, which is according to its website is 
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aimed at ‘transforming the gender status quo in peace, conflict, 
development, and humanitarian affairs.’ Note that the source of this tweet 
again turned out to be Julie Bishop, demonstrating that the ideological 
coding of tweets is not perfectly aligned with or dictated by party affiliation 
(which was blinded to all of the coders).  Finally, many, many tweets turn out
to have no ideological content whatsoever.  They may report on a factory 
that then-Prime Minister Tony Abbot visited one day, allow Leader of the 
House Christopher Pyne to broadcast which minor-league Australian Rules 
Football team he supports, or inform followers about what the Deputy Leader
of the Opposition ate for lunch.  
Each of the three researchers then coded 100 different tweets, and we 
met weekly to discuss how to resolve difficult cases.  Next, to assess whether
our coding approach yielded sufficient intercoder reliability, I created a 
common sample of 250 tweets,15 including 50 tweets each from a Labor 
Party MP, a Liberal Party MP, a Green MP, and from the official accounts of 
the Australian Labor Party and the Liberal Party of Australia.  The identity of 
each tweet’s source was removed from the files that the research assistants 
worked with, and they worked independently from each other at this stage of
the process.  Their categorization of this common set of tweets allowed me 
15 Ultimately, the coders were only able to code 243 of these tweets, because
seven consisted only of URLs or fragments of words.  In my analysis of the 
full corpus of tweets, I also had to delete all tweets that did not contain at 
least one English word (which is necessary to create a document-term matrix
using RTextTools, and indeed for any algorithm or human to make sense of a
tweet.  Out of the full set of 296,741 tweets by Australian politicians through 
August 2015, I removed 5,650 tweets (or 1.9%) because they did not contain
at least one English word, leaving a corpus of 291,091 to categorize.
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to assess intercoder reliability across pairs of researchers.  In 84% of cases, 
the coding by Researcher A matched that of Research B, with Researchers B 
and C agreeing 86% of the time and Researchers A and C matching in 80% 
of cases.  This is a strong level of agreement for a coding exercise in which 
there are three possible outcomes.  Calculating the ‘Cohen’s kappa,’ which 
asks how much better this level of agreement is than what we might expect 
due to chance alone,16 demonstrates that these coders classified the 
ideology of tweets in a reliable, consistent manner. 
After this successful exercise, I worked with the research assistants to 
code a total of 2500 tweets by hand.17  Then I used the software package 
RTextTools18 to turn tweets into bag-of-word matrices that list the frequency 
16 For instance, Researchers A and B agreed at a rate of 84%.  Based on the 
distribution of their codings across the three categories, they would have 
agreed due to random chance alone in only 36% of cases.  Cohen’s kappa 
measures this improvement in classification divided by the expected random
error rate, and is thus (0.84-0.36)/(1–0.36) = 0.48/0.64=0.75. Although there
is no clear cut-off for acceptable levels of kappa, Landis and Koch (1977) 
consider a kappa between 0.61 and 0.80 as indicating “substantial 
agreement,” and a kappa of 0.81 or above as evidence of “almost perfect 
agreement.”  The Cohen’s kappa measures in the high end of the 
“substantial agreement” range for all three pairs of research assistants.
17 While it would have been ideal to randomly sample the training set of 2500
tweets from the full corpus of tweets that I aimed to analyze (see Hand 
2006), I encountered an obstackle: this corpus (tweets collected through 
August 2015) had not been produced by the fall of 2014, when the training 
set needed to be coded.  I created a stratified sample instead, aided as 
maximizing the ideological diversity of the training tweets, by including 
tweets from legislators and party leaders from all four major parties (Labor, 
Liberal, National, and the Greens) in rough proportion to their representation 
in the lower house, with the partisan identity of the tweeter redacted from 
the coding sheet.  
18 See Jurka, Timothy P.  Loren Collingwood, Amber E. Boydstun, Emiliano 
Grossman and Wouter van Atteveldt. 2012, “RTextTools: Automatic Text 
Classification via Supervised Learning,” R package version 1.3.9. 
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of each term used in the document. Using 2200 tweets as the training set, I 
trained the nine machine-learning algorithms included in RTextTools to 
reproduce the human classifications, and then tested the accuracy of each 
algorithm on the remaining 300 tweets in the testing set.  For these testing 
set tweets, the algorithm had to predict which category humans placed the 
tweet in without first accessing that information.  I identified the three best-
performing algorithms, which each registered levels of ‘precision’ (how often 
tweets put into a category by an algorithm were also placed there by hand 
coders) and of ‘recall’ (how often the tweets hand coded into a category 
were also placed there by an algorithm) that ranged between 71% and 76%. 
I then reran the training with only these three algorithms, finding that all 
three algorithms agreed on a coding in 85% of cases, and that the recall of 
the hand coded category was correct in 80% of these cases.  The most 
discriminant words – ‘debt,’ ‘carbon,’ ‘job,’ ‘school,’ ‘stop,’ ‘boat,’ ‘welfare,’ 
‘tax,’ and ‘smallbiz’ – are all closely related to current Australian political 
disputes.  This provided enough confidence to train the algorithms on all 
2500 hand-coded tweets, then use them to code19 the full corpus of the 
http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=RTextTools  . 
19 In all of the analysis reported in the main text, I use a “probability coding” 
approach based on the categorizations from the three best-performing 
algorithms, putting each tweet in the corpus into the category given by the 
algorithm with the strongest probability of being correct.  Another 
reasonable approach is the consensus coding method of putting a tweet into 
a category only if two or more of the three algorithms agree on that 
categorization.  That approach puts more tweets overall into the “non-
ideological” category, but replicating the individual analyses using this 
approach does not lead to substantively different results.   
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291,091 tweets20 sent from the official Twitter account21 (if one existed)22 of 
every sitting member of the Australia House of Parliament and Senate as of 
August, 2015, as well as the accounts of the Australian Labor Party, the 
Greens, the Liberal Party of Australia, and the Nationals. 
20 The tweets were obtained by first compiling a list of all Australian 
members of parliament who had created or maintained a Twitter profile as of
August 2015. That list of Twitter usernames was then passed through a 
Python script which downloaded the message history of each of the 
usernames via Twitter's API.
21 I identified the official Twitter accounts of these legislators from the roster,
which provides Twitter account links, of the Parliament of Australia’s website,
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Members. 
22 As of August 2015, 32 of the 150 Members of Parliament and 30 of 
Australia’s 76 Senators did not have a listed Twitter account. 
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Table A.1. Categorization of Political Issues for Tweet Coding 
Instructions
Left Political Positions Right Political Positions
Higher government spending, 
even if it means higher taxes
Cut government spending, and 
lower taxes
Support regulation of private 
business to preserve the 
environment, protect the rights of 
workers
Want to see businesses 
unhindered by government so that
they can create more jobs
Support a high minimum wage Worry that minimum wages lead 
to fewer jobs
Worry that long prison sentences 
are unfair, expensive, and 
discriminator
Support tough prison sentences to
deter crime, promote public safety
Support same sex marriage, 
abortion rights (pro-choice)
Support traditional marriage and 
oppose abortion rights (pro-life)
Worried about the costs of war Generally supportive of 
involvement in foreign wars
Supportive of clear separation 
between church and state
Supporting of Judeo-Christian 
values guiding politics, perhaps 
even school prayer, in God we 
Trust
Celebrate ethnic diversity and 
granting autonomy to Aboriginal 
population
Worry that Australian identity will 
be eroded by immigration, support
more control of Aboriginal areas
Favor strong action to combat 
global climate change, including a 
carbon tax
Worried that carbon tax and 
environmental regulations will 
hurt business and cost jobs
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Table A.2. Examples of Tweets Placed in Each Ideological Category
Examples of Tweets Coded as Right-Leaning
@AlexHawkeMP RT @TonyAbbottMHR: Today is 
#RedTapeRepealDay. The Govt has reduced 
annual red tape costs by over $2 billion, 
double what we promised.
@FedNatDirector We've stopped the boats, scrapped the 
carbon tax, invested in infrastructure and we 
are fixing the budget #NatsFC #auspol
@SenatorBobDay Mining Tax repeal Press Conf. 
@FamilyFirstAust @SenatorBobDay and LDP 
@DavidLeyonhjelm in Mural Hall, Parliament 
House 3:15pm EST #AusPol
 
@JulieBishopMP Visited #Iraq to demonstrate Australia’s 
support for the Iraqi people in combating 
#Daesh #ISIL 
Examples of Tweets Coded as Left-Leaning
@AlannahMac Today I addressed the crowd at the Rally for 
Renewables Rally on the importance of the 
renewable energy target
@tanya_plibersek RT @MikeCarlton01: Abbott did promise to 
create 1 million new jobs. Just didn't mention
they'd mostly be overseas
@AdamBandt @larissawaters: Economic girly man says 
Mathias Cormann. Using gender as a 
derogatory term is so offensive
@JulieBishopMP @thegenderagency @JohnKerry 
@WilliamJHague I committed to champion 
initiative at UN last Sept - vital cause should 
receive
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Examples of Tweets Coded as Having No Ideological Direction
@TonyAbbottMHR Visited a local defence clothing manufacturer
on the Gold Coast today. Thanks to Betty for 
showing me the ropes!
@cpyne Go the mighty @NorwoodFC in the 
@SANFLnews semi final today against our 
across city rivals Port Adelaide #auspol
@tanya_plibersek Vietnamese chicken lettuce cups for lunch
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